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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, civil recourse theory has emerged as an im-
portant new way of thinking about tort law as individual justice. Like 
corrective justice, civil recourse sees tort law as about deontological 
concepts such as right and wrong, in contrast to utilitarian accounts 
that focus on maximizing social welfare. This Symposium is a testa-
ment to the centrality of civil recourse to contemporary debates in 
tort theory, and private-law theory more broadly. 
Like any new theory, civil recourse theory has drawn its critics. 
The primary architects of civil recourse theory, Ben Zipursky and 
John Goldberg, have pitched the theory as an interpretive one and 
have focused much of their work thus far on the descriptive or ex-
planatory part of the enterprise.1 But some critics have criticized civil 
recourse theory as failing to describe key aspects of tort law or as being 
too indeterminate to explain doctrinal choices or case outcomes. Oth-
er critics, like some at this Symposium, characterize civil recourse 
                                           
?  Associate Professor, William and Mary School of Law. Thanks to Angela Banks, 
Stephen Darwall, Andrew Gold, Michael Steven Green, and Trotter Hardy for thoughtful 
comments on a previous draft, to the attendees at the 2011 Blackstone Lecture at William 
and Mary, where I talked about some of these ideas, to all the participants in the Symposi-
um on Civil Recourse Theory, and particularly to Curtis Bridgeman and the Florida State 
University Law Review staff for organizing the Symposium. Thanks to Jordan Bowman for 
valuable research assistance and Ben Keele for expert library support. 
 1. I have also contributed to this. See Jason M. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 1749 (2007); John C.P. Goldberg, Wrongs Without Recourse: A Comment on 
Jason Solomon’s Judging Plaintiffs, 61 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1 (2008).
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not as a competitor to corrective justice theory at all, but rather a 
variant on or component of it.  
Still other critics have focused on the lack of adequate normative 
foundations, or political theory, undergirding a right to civil re-
course.2 Such a right needs further justification, this argument goes, 
particularly because on its face, the right appears to be one of retalia-
tion or vengeance, and it seems unlikely that this is either norma-
tively attractive or an appropriate part of a modern liberal state.3 As 
one who is sympathetic to civil recourse theory, I am focused on re-
sponding to these critiques.  
In prior work, I tried to develop the conceptual foundation for a 
normative defense of the right to civil recourse. Specifically, I argued 
that the right to recourse could be supported through essentially 
three related steps: (1) the person harmed was entitled to resent the 
wrongdoer, in light of the nature of the wrong; (2) the victim calling 
to account the wrongdoer was a normatively attractive response; and 
(3) the state can help affirm the political ideal of a community of 
equals by providing a forum for equal or mutual accountability where 
individuals can make demands of those who have wronged them.4
Zipursky’s contribution to this Symposium continues to develop the 
normative foundations of the right to recourse, building in part on 
this work.5
Although my focus in this Article is on political theory, the dis-
cussion will bear on the normative foundation (as a matter of legal 
theory) as well. In the prior article, I focused on equal accountability 
as an attractive moral norm and conceptual foundation for the right 
to recourse, drawing in large part on Stephen Darwall’s work in mor-
al philosophy on the “second-person standpoint.”6 But I also suggest-
                                           
 2. Concerning the need for a political theory of recourse, see Jules Coleman & 
Gabe Mendlow, The Normative Structure of Tort Law 25 n.16 (2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ilp/2009papers/ 
ColemanPennWorkshopDraft.pdf, stating “it is hard to assess the recourse view absent a 
good deal more work being done on the side of the relevant political philosophy.” 
 3. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 56 (Jules Coleman & Scott 
Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 4. See Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 1765 (2009). In a related piece, Nathan Oman considers three similar questions in 
justifying civil recourse: (1) When is acting against a wrongdoer justified? (2) Under what 
circumstances should the state be involved in providing a mechanism for such action? (3) 
Are certain kinds of civil wrongs more appropriate for such a response than others? See 
Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 32 (2011). 
 5. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Corrective 
Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 299 (2011).  
 6.  See generally STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY,
RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2006).
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ed that some broader notion of equality might help underwrite the 
state’s involvement in an institution like tort law.7
This Article further explores whether a conception of “equality” 
might support having the right to recourse as a matter of political 
theory. To preview the argument, justifying the right to recourse 
might draw on two distinct, but related, notions of equality—a dis-
tributive one and a relational, or social, one.8
These two conceptions relate in the following way: the right to 
hold accountable those who have wronged you is a good subject to 
principles of distributive justice. And this good is something that the 
state provides to help constitute a community that aspires to social 
equality—where individuals relate to one another as equals. Explain-
ing more what I mean by this is the task of the rest of this Article.9
Before beginning this task, let me pause on method and scope. 
The approach is to look at our society and set of social and political 
institutions and try to abstract from that a set of principles that 
might help explain and justify our existing arrangements.10 But this 
is not a full-blown political theory of civil recourse. It is a tentative 
sketch, building on prior work of my own and others, including those 
in this Symposium.11
 I am not claiming that the distributive justice or social equality 
principles I discuss explain the content of tort law.12 The claim is that 
they might help justify the institution of tort law, or civil justice,13 as 
a matter of legal theory or help us to understand the role of the civil 
justice system in our structure of government as a matter of political 
theory. To be sure, if the distributive justice and social equality prin-
                                           
 7. See Solomon, supra note 4, at 1805-11. 
 8. The particular relationship between these two concepts is heavily influenced by 
David Miller’s conception. See David Miller, Equality and Justice, 10 RATIO 222, 224 
(1997); see also DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 231-32 (1999). 
 9.  I hope to help illuminate the importance of civil recourse theory in understanding 
tort law, without taking a position on whether civil recourse and corrective justice are bet-
ter seen as complementary or rival theories.
 10.  See TERENCE BALL, REAPPRAISING POLITICAL THEORY: REVISIONIST STUDIES IN 
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 57 (1995) (arguing that the role of political theory 
should be to review, appraise, and criticize the arrangements of one’s own society). For 
another account of how and why political theory may operate, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 18-19 (1971) (discussing his method of reflective equilibrium, a part of which is 
deriving a set of principles from the current political system to compare with initial 
“convictions of justice” for justification of the system). 
 11.  This Article builds on the works of Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg 
generally and in this Symposium. For my previous work on the subject of civil recourse, see 
Solomon, supra note 4 and Solomon, supra note 1. See also Oman, supra note 4. 
 12.  Arthur Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, 1 J. TORT L. 3, 20 (2007). 
 13.  I am using the terms “tort law” and “civil justice” more or less synonymously here. 
It might well be that the term “private law” works as well. I remain agnostic on that issue 
for present purposes. 
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ciples are compelling justifications, they may well inform decisions 
about the scope and operation of this area of law.  
 The question of how exactly social equality can underwrite tort 
law will come later,14 but first, let us consider how distributive justice 
principles might support a right to recourse. 
II. RECOURSE AS PART OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
 In this Part, I suggest and consider the following claim: Tort law 
is justified in part as a fair distribution of the right to hold accounta-
ble those who have wronged you by interfering with your rights of 
personhood and property. Let us consider this “right to hold account-
able” a plausible definition of the right to civil recourse and look at 
whether we can think about the institution of tort law as being, in 
part, justified by this principle of distributive justice.  
 By most accounts, our current fault-based system, designed to re-
store the status quo through corrective justice, is an embarrassment 
to traditional distributive justice principles, focused on material 
goods.15 After all, why should we have a system that restores the sta-
tus quo if the status quo is unjust? From a distributive justice per-
spective, if a poor person rear-ends a rich person, why should the 
poor person have to pay to fix the rich person’s car, even if the poor 
person was the one at fault?16
 In an attempt to address this, scholars have taken one of a few 
tacks. Some say that corrective justice is only justified if preexisting 
holdings are distributively just.17 Others say that corrective justice 
and distributive justice are very different concepts altogether, and 
our current fault-based common law of tort is concerned with the 
                                           
 14.  See infra Part III. 
 15.  See Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, 
and Inegalitarian (but Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 270 (2006) (noting 
several flaws in the context of damages that weaken arguments that tort law is grounded 
in principles of distributive justice: “[i]f tort law excludes significant damages because vic-
tims cannot be compensated, then arguments for general damages grounded in corrective 
or distributive justice lose some of their force”); Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-
Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 543-56 (1999) (offering 
several examples of legislation making tort damages inadequate in certain situations). 
 16.  This is a familiar example that others have used to help distinguish 
corrective justice from distributive justice. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND 
WRONGS 304-05 (1992). 
 17. See Stephen R. Perry, Mischief, Misfortune and Tort Law, in ANALYZING LAW:
NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 149 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) (noting that distributive decisions 
about the allocation of benefits and burdens in corrective justice should be constrained by 
conceptions of fairness and equality); see also Arthur Ripstein, Tort, The Division of Re-
sponsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1843 (2004) (“[T]he claim to 
enforceable rights, including enforceable private rights, depends on the existence of a 
largely just basic structure.”). 
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former, not the latter.18 Alternatively, there are those who say that 
our current system needs to be changed to better meet the demands 
of distributive justice.19
 Consider, though, a more capacious definition of distributive jus-
tice. Following John Rawls, Michael Walzer, and others, we can ap-
ply principles of “distributive justice” to a range of social goods, not 
only material goods.20 So distributive justice not only refers to in-
come, wealth, food, and medical care, but also to power, access to jus-
tice, rights, respect, status, and other goods not easily reducible to 
money.21 When the state provides individuals with a right to re-
course, then, it is distributing a social good—specifically, the right of 
individuals to call to account those who have wronged them. 
A.   Recourse for What? 
 One important threshold question is the scope or content of the 
right or rights that the right to recourse is designed to protect. After 
all, the right to recourse can be seen as a secondary or enforcement 
right, with an underlying primary or substantive right that it pro-
tects or vindicates.22 If the underlying right is not one worth protect-
ing, then it is difficult to justify the right to recourse.23
                                           
 18.  See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 180-81 (1980) (arguing 
that, classically, tort law has been best explained as corrective justice for wrongful actions). 
 19.  E.g., Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of 
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 219 (2000) (arguing that “[i]n a world of insurable risk,” 
enterprise liability is preferable to negligence on distributive justice grounds). 
 20.  John Rawls said that the “subject of justice is the . . . way in which the major 
social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties.” RAWLS, supra note 10, at 7. 
See also WILLIAM GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD 6 (1980); IRIS MARION YOUNG,
JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 24-33 (1990) (summarizing the views that 
distributive justice should be applied to non-material goods, but arguing against those 
views); David Miller, Complex Equality, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY 203 (David 
Miller & Michael Walzer eds., 1995) (“An egalitarian society must be one which recognizes 
a number of distinct goods . . . .”). 
 21.  Though this is a common move in political philosophy, not everyone agrees with it. 
See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 20, at 15-16, 24-30 (arguing that while the distributive justice 
framework can be “metaphorically extended” to a range of social goods, the framework still 
treats the issue as one of allocating “static things” rather than evolving “social relations 
and processes”). 
 22.  See Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1873, 1901-06 (2011) (explaining private law as a means for individuals to exercise 
their “moral enforcement rights”); Andrew S. Gold, The Taxonomy of Civil Recourse, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 65, 68-73 (2011) (describing one version of civil recourse as concerned 
with enforcement rights).  
 23.  For example, assume there was a tort of racial nuisance. That is to say, someone 
could bring a lawsuit on the theory that a person of another race moving next door to her 
was interfering with the use and enjoyment of her property. Now, let us assume that the 
person enforcing the right is African American, and the intruding neighbor is white. One 
could have some facially plausible story about the African American traditionally having 
little power and how having the right to recourse helps achieve equality by providing a 
form of legal or political power that the individual might not have otherwise. Nonetheless, 
because the underlying “right” entails a commitment to discrimination based on a charac-
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 So what does the right to recourse protect? The answer can be de-
fined in general terms by looking broadly at the law of torts, or the 
law of wrongs. Although tort law is frequently conceived of as pro-
tecting a variety of interests, one can also view it as a way of support-
ing individual freedom or autonomy by “protecting people’s liberty, 
property, and security.”24 At its core in negligence law, tort law pro-
tects people from others exercising liberty in such a way, or to such a 
degree, that it interferes too much with their security—specifically, 
their person or property.  
 One can think of a few reasons why this right to security in person 
or property gets an individual right to recourse. First, the security 
interest protected, particularly as to bodily integrity, is at the essence 
of “personhood.” As Mayo Moran put it:  
The single most important interest associated with personhood is 
the right to physical integrity, expressed through the fact that per-
sons, unlike things, have the right to autonomy and hence to vin-
dicate violations of physical integrity. This right is enshrined both 
in tort law and in criminal law and is the most highly protected in-
terest in both of those areas of law.25
Second, the underlying right of bodily integrity and personal se-
curity is a fundamental aspect of freedom.26 In order to go about one’s 
business in a society of strangers, one needs to know that one will 
not be hurt by people being careless. And if you are hurt, you can call 
the other person to account. That might give you some confidence to 
go about your affairs.27
The reality, though, is that we are in a constant state of vulnera-
bility arising, as Martha Fineman puts it, “from our embodiment, 
which carries with it the ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and 
                                                                                                                  
teristic that should not be normatively relevant, the right to recourse cannot apply. Thanks 
to Michael Steven Green for this example and, more generally, for the point that the justi-
fication for a right to recourse is highly dependent on the content of the underlying right. 
 24.  Gregory C. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, 18 LEGAL THEORY
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 45, 45-49), available at http://works.bepress.com/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=gregorykeating (sketching a unified account of 
the core primary rights in tort as those protecting individuals from harm and intrusions 
on sovereignty). 
 25.  Mayo Moran, The Mutually Constitutive Nature of Public and Private Law, in THE 
GOALS OF PRIVATE LAW 17, 32 (Andrew Robertson & Tang Hang Wu eds., 2009); see also
Arthur Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1968 (2007) 
(“[B]odily health and integrity are fundamental to a person’s ability to make his or her own 
way in the world.”).  
 26.  See Ripstein, supra note 25; see also STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS & CONSTRAINT:
ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 242 (1995) (identifying classical liberalism with 
the view that all individuals must be “protected equally from third-party injury” and have 
“equal access to the law”). 
 27.  See Solomon, supra note 4, at 1809. Though this is certainly an empirical question. 
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misfortune.”28 This vulnerability is particularly salient in a society of 
strangers, where we have a web of daily interactions in social and 
economic life and no particular basis for trusting those with whom 
we interact. We can see this in the position of the customer of a gro-
cery store who has to go from aisle to aisle and cannot worry about 
whether the floor has been properly swept and puddles have been 
properly cleaned up. We can see this in the doctor-patient relation-
ship where, when submitting to a medical procedure, one has to nec-
essarily put one’s fate in the hands of another.29
 We can also see this in the position of the consumer in a mass-
market economy who has to rely on medicines made in a faraway 
place by strangers who have no obligations to her in particular.30 Or 
someone buying a car who, in order to get to work or school or just 
about anywhere else, has to trust that the car is made properly and 
will be safe traveling at more than sixty miles per hour alongside 
many others doing the same.31
And again, one can certainly see this vulnerability in the way 
that we each are subject to the safe driving of others for our physical 
security and bodily integrity. If someone decides to use a cell phone 
or text and takes her eyes off the road, we could be harmed and often 
cannot do much about it. We have to rely on the due care of others for 
our well-being.  
So it can be seen as plausible that if an individual, through care-
lessness or otherwise, takes advantage of our position of vulnerabil-
ity, the state would want to set up a system whereby we could then 
make the other person—the wrongdoer—vulnerable to us. I use vul-
                                           
 28.  See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in 
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 9 (2008). 
 29.  See Mark A. Hall, Can You Trust A Doctor You Can’t Sue?, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 303 
(2005) (“Doctor-patient relationships are characterized by levels of intimacy, dependency, 
and vulnerability . . . .”); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 
ALA. L. REV. 705, 720 (1989) (“The power of doctors over the welfare of their patients is of 
course enormous.”); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-82 (D.C. Cir. 1972). “The pa-
tient’s reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted 
obligations beyond those associated with arms length transactions. His dependence upon 
the physician for information affecting his well-being, in terms of contemplated treatment, 
is well-nigh abject.” Id. at 782 (footnote omitted). 
 30.  See Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass 
Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 899 (“Corporate entities that mass- 
produce products or conduct risk-creating activities leading to mass harms also have far 
greater power than the individuals they harm both within the relationship and with the 
outside world.”). 
 31.  Though one could certainly argue that the market should take care of some of 
these examples, there are various market failures that make this theoretical possibility an 
unrealistic one. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial 
Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1436-37 (2007) (describing 
the market failure “result[ing] from ordinary consumers’ misinformation and cognitive 
limitations” as critical to the underpinnings of products liability law). 
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nerable here in a different sense: the sense of being subject to our 
demands—demands for answers, for compensation, and for justice.32
B.   A Just Distribution of the Right to Recourse 
 Before people are given the right to recourse—say, in the state of 
nature or in a society without an equal or just distribution of the 
right to recourse—there are still ways that some, but not all, people 
can respond and hold others accountable when they feel they have 
been wronged. 
 We can see examples of this in literature. In the best-selling novel-
turned-movie The Help, set in 1960s Mississippi, when an African-
American maid, Minny, tells a writer true but unflattering stories 
about the white family for whom she worked, the white man in the 
family gets Minny’s husband fired from his job.33 The white man felt 
he was wronged and held the maid accountable, with no neutral forum 
to determine what forms of accountability, if any, were appropriate.  
 But in the same book, when Minny was blackballed from working 
for the white families in town for allegedly stealing from a woman for 
whom she had worked, she had no opportunity to challenge her ac-
cuser by, for example, bringing a claim for defamation.34
 Similarly, in the Man Booker Prize-winning novel The White 
Tiger, set in contemporary India, a poor boy was run down and killed 
by a reckless driver, the wife of a rich man.35 The rich man had con-
nections to the police department and got them to drop any investiga-
tion. Though the wife, feeling guilty, wanted to find the family and 
make amends for compensation, the rest of her family overruled her, 
and we can safely assume the poor family had no wherewithal to find 
a lawyer to bring a case.36
 But in the same book, when a different rich man’s family feels 
wronged because their servant had failed to protect their son, the 
rich man is able to hold the servant accountable by killing him and 
his relatives, again without a neutral forum to judge the demands.37
                                           
 32.  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort and 
Moral Luck, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 97, 110 (2008); Dale Miller, Disrespect and the 
Experience of Injustice, 52 ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 527, 531 (2001) (summarizing research 
showing that “[p]eople think they are entitled to explanations and accounts for any actions 
that have personal consequences for them”).  
 33.  See KATHRYN STOCKETT, THE HELP 437-38 (2009).  
 34.  Id. at 21. 
 35.  ARAVIND ADIGA, THE WHITE TIGER 134-45 (2008). I first talked about this episode 
in Jason M. Solomon, What is Civil Justice?, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 319-20 (2010). 
 36.  ADIGA, supra note 35, at 153. A similar example can be found in CHARLES DICKENS,
A TALE OF TWO CITIES, recounted in Oman, supra note 4, at 60-63 (contrasting this with JOHN 
GRISHAM, THE RAINMAKER, where the victim’s mother was able to confront the wrongdoer).  
 37.  ADIGA, supra note 35, at 56-57.
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 Or one can think about the right to recourse historically. Try to 
imagine a peasant in fifteenth century England calling to account a 
noble whose carelessness in keeping his cows fenced in led to the 
cows escaping and eating the peasant’s food. It is impossible to do so. 
In a more hierarchical society, people in the lower orders could not 
call the upper class to account.38 Indeed, we might say that the fact 
that the noble is not answerable to the peasant helps define the hier-
archy in a society. That is, the lack of answerability is part of what 
tells us: this is not an egalitarian society.  
 With the right to recourse distributed to all citizens, the ability to 
hold others accountable is not limited to the strong, powerful, 
wealthy, or well-connected. The right provided, though, is still lim-
ited in important ways. Having now seen examples where the right 
to hold others accountable is not fairly or widely distributed, we can 
now explore the principles by which we decide who is so empowered 
in our civil justice system.
C.   How is the Right Distributed? By What Principles? 
With any good subject to distributive justice principles, the first 
step is to explain why it is a good that need be governed by principles 
of distributive justice at all. That is what we have just done in 
sketching an account of the right to recourse as a means of empow-
erment in response to the violation of the individual’s state of vulner-
ability. Because the rights of person and property are fundamental, 
the right to recourse is critical both as a means of protecting the un-
derlying right before any harm occurs and as a means of underscor-
ing social equality after the harm.39
The next step is to determine exactly what kind of distributive 
justice principles do and ought to govern the right. Here, I focus on 
the existing principles that govern distribution and merely gesture 
towards possible critiques or improvements.  
Today, in the U.S. civil justice system, the right to recourse is dis-
tributed largely based on the amount of harm suffered, and perhaps 
the amount wronged. If you have the right kind and amount of harm, 
you should be able to get a lawyer to take your case thanks to the 
relatively unusual contingency-fee system in the United States. This 
means that your ability to get recourse does not depend on your 
wealth. Certainly, wealth helps—you will have a broader choice of 
lawyers and need not depend on having enough physical harm to at-
                                           
 38.  See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 67, 101 (2010) (citing Don Herzog, Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s Tanner Lecture 2-3 
(Apr. 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript)). 
 39.  I will explain more what I mean by the social equality aspect of this in Part III. 
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tract a lawyer at all—but wealth is not necessary for redress or ac-
cess to justice.  
 The right to make demands of one who has wronged you is also 
distributed by the type of harm. The closer the harm is to the court 
interests of bodily integrity and property, then the greater chance 
you will have the right to hold another accountable. For example, 
cases of emotional harm are only cognizable if derived from physical 
harm in some way.40 And purely economic harm, if not tied to an in-
jury to person or property, is generally not something that one can 
use to hold another accountable.41 The type of harm, then, is a key 
mechanism for distributing the right to recourse. 
Thinking about the distribution of the right to recourse in this 
way—as being governed by the type and amount of harm—might also 
provide a basis for criticizing certain “tort reform” efforts such as 
caps on noneconomic and punitive damages, for example. Under non-
economic damage caps, people who do not work are going to be sys-
tematically less likely to get a lawyer to take their case and invest 
the resources necessary to hold the wrongdoer accountable. And if we 
think that the degree of wronging is also an important basis for dis-
tributing the right, then both punitive and noneconomic damage caps 
become suspect, particularly in cases with low economic damages. 
 However the question remains: why do distributive justice princi-
ples support an individual right to recourse as opposed to, say, a 
right to compensation? For now, having seen the kind of distributive 
principles that support the right to recourse, we return to the idea of 
social equality and its relationship to both principles of distributive 
justice and the right to recourse.  
III.   RECOURSE AS PART OF SOCIAL EQUALITY
 We have now seen how the right to recourse might be considered a 
good subject to distributive justice principles, tied as it is to funda-
mental rights of personhood and property. Questions remain, though, 
about the kind of equality this good supports. We can refer to this in 
part as the familiar “equality of what?” question and then also ask 
how exactly the right to recourse instantiates that kind of equality.  
 The leading civil recourse theorists rely heavily on the work of 
John Locke, who talked quite specifically about the right to redress in 
terms that resonate with the idea of civil recourse.42 And given 
                                           
 40.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12 (5th ed. W. Page 
Keeton ed., 1984) (noting that “the law has been slow to accept interest in peace of mind as 
entitled to independent legal protection”).
 41.  Id. § 101 (noting that tort action for purchasers suffering intangible economic loss 
is limited).  
 42.  See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and 
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 541; John C.P. Goldberg & 
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Locke’s influence on the Framers, one could look to his social contract 
ideas for guidance about the place of recourse in political theory.43
For Locke, we have the right to recourse because this is something 
we had in the state of nature—the ability to act against another 
through self-help.44 When we form a society, we give up that right—a 
right often enforced violently—in exchange for a substitute right to 
act through the state in a mediated way.45
 But perhaps we ought look to another favorite political theorist at 
the time of the founding, Rousseau.46 For Rousseau, the transition 
from the state of nature to society is more problematic. Unequal po-
litical, economic, and social power differentials prevail.47 And so the 
way to create a community of equals for Rousseau was not to make 
sure that individuals had the rights they had in the state of nature 
but actually to give them new rights through political institutions.48
                                                                                                                  
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 982 (2010); Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE &
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 637-42 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 43.  Locke’s philosophy is often looked to for explanation or guidance of American po-
litical features. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding 
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1430 (1990) (“[Locke’s] influence on 
the Americans and the first amendment was most direct.”); William Michael Treanor, 
Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 720 (1997). 
But see Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 536 (1995) (“In short order the vision of America as an applied version 
of the Two Treatises of Government fell victim to exacting scholarly criticism by specialists 
in early American history.”).  
 44. Goldberg, supra note 42, at 541 (“Locke maintained that an individual’s delegation 
of governing power to the state does not include a renunciation of his right to obtain re-
dress from one who has wrongfully injured him.”).  
 45.  See, e.g., id. at 541-44. “Locke’s social contract theory claims that victims of 
wrongs possess a natural right to reparations from wrongdoers, and that government, as 
custodian of individuals’ rights, owes it to them to provide a law of reparations.” Id. at 544; 
see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 
735-37 (2003) [hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; Zipursky, supra note 42, at 637-44; 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1, 85-86 (1998) (discussing the fairness of providing an avenue of recourse using “the 
language of social contract theory” (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
§§ 7-10 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 1980) (1690))). 
 46.  See State v. Clark, 592 S.W.2d 709, 721 (Mo. 1979) (“History tells us that 
the Framers . . . were influenced by the teachings of Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, and others, 
and by the social contract concept they espoused.”). 
 47.  Christopher Bertram, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring ed. 2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/spr2011/entries/rousseau/ (describing Rousseau’s description of society as one where 
“unequal and exploitative social relations” were backed by the state and arguing that his 
social contract was intended as an alternative). 
 48.  This is unlike a Lockean society, which enforces preexisting natural rights. 
Rousseau envisioned that the people, through the “general will,” would deliberate and 
decide which rights were necessary for a just society. For Rousseau, these societal rights 
replaced the natural equality, the physical equality that existed in the state of nature, with 
a different kind of equality. See PIOTR HOFFMAN, FREEDOM, EQUALITY, POWER: THE
ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF HOBBES, LOCKE, AND 
ROUSSEAU 234 (1999) (“[T]he fundamental contract, on the contrary, substitutes a moral 
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And those rights are in part rights against other persons, of which 
the right to recourse (though not discussed specifically by Rousseau) 
ought be considered a prime example.49 In order to counter the inevi-
table inequalities that result when forming a society, then, we need a 
political institution like the civil justice system to help constitute re-
lationships among equals. 
 But how exactly does the right to recourse fit into this Rousseau-
ean vision? Let us start with some definitional preliminaries. One 
might want to achieve something called “social equality,” but the 
term has a multitude of meanings and components.50 Let us define it 
as the philosopher and equality theorist Samuel Scheffler does: “the 
question of what it is for people to relate to one another as equals.”51
It is an ideal for a political community that is reflected or instantiat-
ed in many of our governmental structures, political mechanisms, 
and social practices. 
 Michael Walzer calls a socially-equal society a “society of misters,” 
where people have no formal rank; rather, everyone from the garden-
er to the CEO is addressed as “mister.”52 Put another way, we can 
call social equality “the absence of any natural ranking of individuals 
into those who command and those who obey.”53 Indeed, in the civil 
justice system, a person can be one who makes a demand one day, 
and one who answers such a demand the next, sometimes in the 
same lawsuit. 
                                                                                                                  
and legitimate equality for whatever physical inequality nature may have placed between 
men.”); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 12 (Paul Negri & Drew Silver 
eds., G.D.H. Cole trans., Dover Publications 2003) (1762) (“[T]he civil state produces a very 
remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct and giving his 
actions the morality they had formerly lacked.”).  
 49.  Rousseau did acknowledge that power over one another in society would result in 
mutual acknowledgement and respect. HOFFMAN, supra note 48, at 202 (“On the one hand, 
I expect the other to acknowledge, in word and in action, my superiority over him . . . . But, 
at the same time, I expect this acknowledgment from a being like myself even if appearing 
outside me. . . . Thus, while I expect from him the acknowledgement of my superiority, he 
expects from me—for the same reasons—the acknowledgement of his superiority.”). 
 50.  I make no claim that what follows is a comprehensive overview. For contemporary 
introductions to the idea or ideas of equality, see generally G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE 
AND EQUALITY (2008); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF EQUALITY (2000); WILL KYMLICKA, Liberal Equality, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 50-94 (1990); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992). 
 51.  Samuel Scheffler, Equality as the Virtue of Sovereigns: A Reply to Ronald 
Dworkin, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199, 204 (2003). 
 52.  MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
252 (1983) (“The absence of a universal title suggests the continued exclusion . . . [from] the 
sphere of recognition as it is currently constituted.”).  
 53.  GERALD GAUS, POLITICAL CONCEPTS AND POLITICAL THEORIES 143 (2000) 
(referring to this as “fundamental human equality” in the liberal egalitarian tradition).  
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 We can think of many things that might contribute to social equal-
ity: equality of opportunity,54 which could be provided through a free 
public education paid for by the taxpayers; equality of resources,55
which one could progress towards through a progressive tax system56
or a guaranteed income for people over a certain age;57 equality of cit-
izenship or participation, by providing everyone equal voting rights, 
speech rights, and association rights;58 or equality of fortune or mis-
fortune, which could be supported through a universal health insur-
ance system or publicly funded disability insurance for people who 
cannot work.  
  So what is missing? It sounds like we have described a number of 
things which might affirm “social equality,” an ideal where individu-
als can interact with one another as equals.59 But what is missing is a 
kind of equality that is interpersonal or relational. This is the kind of 
equality instantiated by civil recourse.  
 This kind of relational equality has been advanced by contempo-
rary political philosophers like Elizabeth Anderson, Samuel 
Scheffler, Michael Walzer, and Iris Marion Young, but its roots go 
back at least to the nineteenth century.60 It is interpersonal and so is 
                                           
 54.  For a definition, see DWORKIN, supra note 50, at 13 (“[O]ne prominent form holds 
that people are denied equality when their superior position in either welfare or resources 
is counted against them in the competition for university places or jobs . . . .”). 
 55.  This is the type of equality that Ronald Dworkin has advocated. For an account, 
see id. at 65-119.  
 56.  Id. at 91, 99-109. 
 57.  In a system such as Dworkin’s equality of resources, old age would be a matter of 
brute luck, and would therefore be insured against. For a discussion of handicaps and 
brute luck versus option luck, see id. at 73-83. 
 58.  For an account of equality of citizenship, see generally Kenneth L. Karst, The 
Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term Foreword: 
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). See 
also Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause,
55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2007) (arguing that equal citizenship gives citizens a right to 
respect and rights to participation in public life); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters,
17 GA. L. REV. 245, 248 (1983) (arguing that the chief citizenship values are respect, partic-
ipation, and responsibility to the community and its members); Goodwin Liu, Education, 
Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 335 (2006) (arguing that the citi-
zenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal rights to membership, 
participation, and dignity).  
 59.  For a definition of “social equality” as being “a society in which people regard and 
treat one another as equals,” see MILLER, supra note 8, at 232. See also Miller, supra note 
20, at 198-99 (describing social equality as the type of equality that describes the character 
of relationships); David Miller, Introduction, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY, supra 
note 20, at 1, 12 (summarizing the notion of “complex equality” as a society in which 
relationships between persons “manifest a certain kind of equality”). Jack M. Balkin has 
recently outlined a tripartite theory for equality, as defined by the Supreme Court—civil, 
social, and political. He would put the ability to “sue and be sued” in the “civil equality” 
category. See Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1694 (2005).  
 60.  See DAVID SCHMIDTZ, ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 117 (“[E]galitarians such as Walzer, 
Young, and Anderson seem to be regrouping under the banner of an egalitarianism that 
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tied closely to the moral ideal of equal accountability or answerabil-
ity.61 This is equality as a social relationship—and we can think 
about it as something between you and me.62 The idea is that people 
can look out in the world, in their community, and in their society 
and say: “I am equal to you and you are equal to me.”  
 What does civil recourse have to do with any of these kinds of ab-
stract conceptions of equality? By empowering individuals with the 
right to recourse, the state affirms relational equality in giving indi-
viduals the authority to make demands of others and also the obliga-
tion to respond to those demands. And then in exercising the right, in 
the “doing” of recourse, the power allows an individual to say in a 
very concrete way: You are not better than me. You cannot do that to 
me. You owe me answers and amends.  
 In essence, the state demonstrates a commitment to social equali-
ty through the “empowering”—simply through the distribution of the 
right—and then again in the “doing”63—providing a forum for indi-
viduals to make putatively legitimate demands of those who have 
                                                                                                                  
has roots in a nineteenth-century rebellion against oppression, when egalitarianism was a 
genuinely liberal movement, allied with nineteenth-century utilitarianism in opposing 
authoritarian aristocracy.”). Jonathan Wolff also attributes the roots of these egalitarians 
to the early nineteenth century. See Jonathan Wolff, Equality: The Recent History of an 
Idea, 4 J. MORAL PHIL. 125, 134 (2007) (“This move towards ‘relational’ or ‘social’ equality 
picks up a concern running from a older tradition in thinking of equality, exemplified in 
the works of such thinkers as R.H. Tawney . . . .” ). See also R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 86-88
(1931), for a discussion of social equality and the demerits of a system marked by 
differences of respect based on class distinctions.  
 61.  See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. For more on how the ideal of mutual 
accountability or answerability is an important aspect of tort law, see Hershovitz, supra
note 38, at 135-37.  
 62.  For example, Elizabeth Anderson acknowledges that a relation of respect between 
individuals is a fundamental component of equality. See Elizabeth Anderson, What is the 
Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 336 (1999). For other accounts of equality that 
emphasize a relational component, see Timothy Hinton, Must Egalitarians Choose between 
Fairness and Respect?, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 72, 80 (2001) (arguing that for equality to 
prevail, unjust social relations between groups must be eliminated); Hee-Kang Kim, 
Equality as an Evaluation of Social Relations, 20 PUB. AFF. Q. 313, 313 (2006) (noting that 
“[u]nderstanding social relations is central to theorizing equality, and the purpose of 
egalitarian theory is to maintain and promote just social relations in which groups of 
people stand in relation to one another as equals”); Richard Norman, Equality, Priority, 
and Social Justice, 12 RATIO 178, 191 (1999) (arguing that the moral significance of 
equality lies in the nature of social relations); Samuel Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism?,
31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5, 33-34 (2003) (arguing that equality is most compelling when the 
relationship between individuals has the structure and character of a “society of equals”); 
and Jonathon Wolff, Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 97, 
109 (1998) (noting that equality is a relation of respect and self-respect: “I am your equal, 
not your superior”).  
 63.  See Hershovitz, supra note 38 (describing these as tort’s “collateral benefits”);
John Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility, 23 O.J.L.S 157, 167 (2003) (“The fundamental 
point is to have structured explanatory dialogues in public, in which the object of 
explanation is ourselves. This point is not a point relative to which the procedure is 
instrumental; rather the point is in the procedure.”). 
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wronged them. This forum is not necessarily a courtroom but simply 
the legal system itself and all that operates in its shadow. 
A.   Equality of Status 
 In thinking about the “equality of what?” question, then, this 
analysis of the nature of the wrong and the response tells us that we 
are talking about equality of status or social power. Let us define 
“status” for these purposes, following David Miller, as “a person’s 
basic standing within a society, as manifested by the way in which he 
or she is regarded by the public institutions and by other individu-
als.”64 And true equality of status would achieve the social- equality 
ideal described above.65
 In a sense, the wrong is taking advantage of another’s vulnerabil-
ity—defined as the embodiment of susceptibility to harm—by show-
ing her insufficient care. In doing so, the wrongdoer is treating her as 
less than an equal.66 Empowering the victim makes clear that the 
“public institutions” do not share the view of her “basic standing 
within . . . society” evidenced by the wrongdoer’s conduct and serves 
as a counter to the harm and its stark reminder of human vulnerabil-
ity.67 And in exercising the right to recourse—in the doing of justice—
the one empowered is able to remind the wrongdoer that she is worth 
respect and attention, and thus her status is that of an equal.  
 The mistreatment at issue in civil justice tends to take place in 
the particular transaction or incident. But most wrongs are also 
grounded in a social relationship which makes one person vulnerable 
to another. Familiar examples include a doctor and his patient, a 
business and its customers, a product manufacturer and the product 
user.68 To be sure, a person can be vulnerable one day and the domi-
nator the next. And people can be vulnerable to one another at the 
same time, such as two drivers on a highway.  
 Exercising too much liberty in violation of another’s security of-
fends the notion of a community of equals by taking more than one’s 
fair share.69 In doing so, it says that I am more important than you, 
                                           
 64.  Miller, supra note 20, at 206. Miller offered this definition as part of interpreting 
Michael Walzer’s idea of “complex equality.” Id. 
 65.  See MILLER, supra note 8, at 232 (using the terms “equality of status” and “social 
equality” synonymously). 
 66.  See Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
THE LAW OF TORTS 159 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (arguing that the wrongfulness in 
tort, according to Aristotle’s version of corrective justice, can be seen as acting in a way 
that is “inconsistent with the equal status of other affected agents”). 
 67.  Miller, supra note 20, at 206. 
 68.  See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.  
 69.  For Zipursky’s definition of the underlying right, see Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2040 (2007) (“Part and parcel of 
the idea that such mutual care is a basic expectation of one another is the idea that to 
injure someone through failing to take such care is to wrong that person.”). For Ripstein’s 
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or my plans and goals are more important than yours—which is high-
ly objectionable from the standpoint of a liberal society with equal 
status. To allow such things to go unchecked would be to acquiesce in 
an inegalitarian society. 
 In this way, we can see the moral perspective of reciprocal rights 
and obligations explicated through Darwall’s second-person stand-
point turned into a political ideal that recognizes that in order to 
have genuine social relationships of equality, we need to give indi-
viduals “normative powers” that they perhaps did not have before the 
state, before law.70
B.   Equality in the Empowering 
 When equality has been invoked by the recourse theorists, it has 
been in the sense of the state showing equal respect for, or underscor-
ing the equal moral worth of, all persons by providing recourse to 
hold others accountable when they have been wronged.71 In setting 
up a system whereby individuals can make demands of others, and 
others are treated as responsible agents who can respond to those 
moral claims, the state underscores the moral authority of both 
plaintiffs and defendants.72 Here, the right to recourse promotes so-
cial equality simply because it exists. 73   
 How exactly does the right to recourse help contribute to social 
equality? Ex ante, it provides a signal, a mark, a little like a tattoo—
the right to recourse—you either have it or not. And if you have it, it 
means you are someone to be reckoned with or someone whose well-
being one must consider.74
                                                                                                                  
discussion, see ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 49-50 
(paperback ed. 2001) and Ripstein, supra note 17, at 1820-21. Keating also discusses the 
balance between the exercise of liberty and security. Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian 
Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1859 (2004).  
 70.  See Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers (pt. II), 46 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 59 (Supp. 1972).  
 71.  This sense of equality as state-provided “equal respect” is consistent with Ronald 
Dworkin’s overall political theory account in SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY. See DWORKIN, supra note 50. 
 72.  See Stephen Darwall & Julian Darwall, Civil Recourse as Mutual Accountability,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17, 30-31 (2011); see also Stephen Darwall, Justice and Retaliation,
39 PHIL. PAPERS 315, 324-26 (2010). 
 73.  As John Goldberg put it, “As the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment under-
stood, to render a person capable of suing (and being sued) for injuries suffered (and 
caused) is to enforce a conception of equality.” Goldberg, supra note 42, at 607-08. “While 
today some immunities remain, and wealthy defendants undoubtedly enjoy important ad-
vantages in the litigation system, tort law instantiates a notion of equality.” Id. at 608; see 
also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 42, at 982 (“[H]olding individuals accountable . . . 
reinforces a notion of democratic equality . . . .”). 
 74.  See PETER M. GERHART, TORT LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 5 (2010) (“[Tort law] 
determines when and how an actor must consider the well-being of others when deciding 
how to act.”); see also Arthur Ripstein, Closing the Gap, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 61, 76 
(2008) (“The standard of care is objective, because it permits each person to impose the 
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 But does anyone really know it exists? Do people think about the 
fact that they can sue others who have wronged them?75 I would ar-
gue that they do, even if they do not know the specifics of when they 
can do so. They may know this through the media, by seeing on tele-
vision or reading news accounts of other lawsuits. Perhaps they or 
someone they know has been involved in a lawsuit.76 Perhaps they 
have served on a civil jury.  
 People have a general understanding that if something goes 
wrong, you can always “sue the bastard.” And that might well give 
people a sense that they have some degree of empowerment,77 even if 
they never use the right of action and even if they do not know the 
precise circumstances when they could take advantage of it. 
 The wrong that gives rise to the right to recourse is the failure to 
moderate one’s own exercise of liberty in light of others’ liberty and 
security interests. In doing so, the wrongdoer has treated the indi-
vidual harmed as less than a social equal, someone not worthy of 
equal respect. The wronged individual’s interests were treated as less 
important than the wrongdoer’s, and the wrongdoer took advantage 
of the individual’s (inevitable) vulnerability. 
 The logical response, then, is one of empowerment—the flipside of 
vulnerability. The state’s interest is in underscoring, for the specific 
wrongdoer and others, the obligations they owe to all and in affirm-
ing the victim’s status as a moral and social equal worthy of respect. 
So the right to recourse is a means of empowering the victim by 
providing the political authority for, and therefore underscoring the 
legitimacy of, making demands on the wrongdoer. 
C.   Equality in the “Doing” 
 Once the complaint is brought, and litigation begins, the “doing” 
itself may show social equality.78 As Milner Ball, Robert Burns, and 
                                                                                                                  
same degree of risk on others as others impose on them.”); Zipursky, supra note 69, at 
2033-40 (explaining the “civil competency theory” of the reasonable person standard). 
 75.  For an overview of what we know and what we do not know about who brings 
lawsuits and why, see generally Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What 
We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and 
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). See also Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know 
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1147, 1286-88 (1992) (arguing that data collected about the civil justice is strikingly deficient). 
 76.  According to a 1992 survey commissioned by the American Bar Association, about 
20% of Americans have sued someone and about 16% have been sued. Gary A. Hengstler, 
Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79 A.B.A. J. 60, 60-61 (1993).  
 77.  Ronen Perry, Empowerment and Tort Law, 76 TENN. L. REV. 959, 979-80 (2009) 
(“Civil litigation may serve to empower victims in several ways.”). 
 78.  See Gardner, supra note 63, at 167 (arguing that “the point is in the procedure”); 
see also Hershovitz, supra note 38, at 103 (noting that tort procedures are themselves “a 
way of doing justice”); William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1881 (2002) (noting that procedures can “generate greater equi-
page equality,” which can enhance social equality). 
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others have pointed out, the formality and ritual of the trial embodies 
a commitment to equal respect for each party, whether they are ac-
cused of wrongdoing or alleging wronging, rich or poor.79 Conversely, 
a lack of proper process can undermine social equality, or weaken the 
underlying right, as is seen in a variety of contexts.80 Even if 
the answers do not come in open court, they still come in depositions 
or even earlier than that, with defendants having to explain to their 
lawyers what they did for the purposes of settlement.81 The point is, 
defendants cannot exercise too much liberty, infringe on another’s 
security, and simply walk away.  
 When the harm occurs, the wrongdoers know they owe the victims 
a settling of accounts.82 As creditors of sorts, the victims will not just 
go away.83 They must be dealt with. After accounts have been settled, 
the plaintiffs may feel that they have received some kind of response 
and are not left powerless after suffering harm.84 The defendants 
                                           
 79.  See MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMAN-
ISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS 46 (1981); Robert P. Burns, What Will We Lose if the Trial 
Vanishes? 2 (Nw. Univ. Sch. Law: Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 11-48, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1851776. 
 80.  For discussions about the importance of procedure to equality in a variety of con-
texts see, for example, Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of 
Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 908 (2009) (noting that, with regard to guaranteeing 
access to procedural rights, “respect for individual dignity applies equally to defendants 
and plaintiffs”); Brittany A. Olwine, One Step Forward, But Two Steps Back: Why Gacaca 
in Rwanda is Jeopardizing the Good Effect of Akayesu on Women’s Rights, 17 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 639, 653-56 (2011) (demonstrating how an informal trial known as “gacaca” 
in Rwanda has undermined the impact of recognizing rape as a crime against humanity); 
and Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1150 (2006) 
(noting that the process of litigation offers people dignity and recognition). 
 81.  See, e.g., A.M. Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. BAR REV. 155, 159 
(1973) (describing litigation over the drug thalidomide, where few cases went to trial but 
there was much public discussion, and the company’s “executive officers . . . had to spend 
many hours examining their practices, engaging in discussions with lawyers, and justifying 
their stewardship to their shareholders”). 
 82.  WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 17-20 (2006) (noting the importance of 
“[g]etting the measure right” such that both parties can sense the rightness in it is at the 
core of systems of justice). 
 83.  For a discussion of debt as a social relationship, see Margaret Atwood, Op-Ed., A
Matter of Life and Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/ 
opinion/22atwood.html (“If you don’t pay back what’s owed, you cause harm to others.”).  
 84.  For a comparative study of litigants’ perception of different procedures within the 
civil justice system post-litigation, see FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE 9 (1993) (“Overall, claimants appear to be satisfied with the process even when 
they do not receive compensation.”); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort 
Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 953, 967 (1990) (“As one might expect, trials were seen as more dignified and more 
careful than bilateral settlements. Litigants in trials also reported that they understood 
the litigation process better and that they felt they participated more than did litigants in 
bilateral settlement cases.”); and Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: 
Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 372 (1996) (“Litigants 
whose cases were decided by trial or arbitration found those experiences more fair, digni-
fied, and careful than did those whose cases ended by negotiations with or without a 
judge.”). See also Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of 
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may realize that their obligations extend to a wider circle than their 
immediate family, friends, and colleagues.85
 Importantly, the “doing” instantiates social equality by pushing 
back against inequality. That is, a certain kind of equality—one that 
is about social relations, the relations of individuals (or sometimes 
groups) to one another—is affirmed by efforts to abolish inequality, 
hierarchies, and differences in status unrelated to merit (say, skin 
color as a factor in hiring in a society where people of color have al-
ways been second-class citizens).86
 The philosopher Elizabeth Anderson relies particularly on the civil 
rights movement as an example of this kind of equality. The civil 
rights movement in large part, as she describes it, worked to erase 
this kind of status hierarchy.87 In a sense, it was less about achieving 
some kind of affirmative ideal than about tearing down the existing 
order of inequality.88 If you were black or if you were a woman, the 
then-existing hierarchy said you were of lower status. The civil rights 
movement came along and said: “No, we are going to tear that 
down.”89 In the same way, exercising the right to recourse is a way of 
combating the inequality expressed through the wrong of failing to 
respect another’s interests.  
 In bringing the lawsuit itself, the plaintiff makes a demand and 
does say, implicitly or explicitly: “You cannot do that to me.” This is 
“acting against” the defendant in the way that if someone rear-ends 
your car and drives away, you might call the police—to make sure 
the other driver is held accountable, to stand up for yourself, and to 
communicate that you will not take it lying down.  
                                                                                                                  
Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 341 (2007) (arguing that plaintiffs’ desire to 
sue for answers and dignity is, in general, not sufficiently taken into account by their law-
yers and that plaintiffs experience frustration as a result).  
 85.  Implicit in this is that the defendant may be more mindful of others’ well-being 
going forward. This sounds a lot like a deterrence rationale, and to a certain extent, it is; 
however, in talking about social and moral obligations, I mean a very different kind of 
reason than regulating risky activity. Thanks to Trotter Hardy for pushing me on this 
point. T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 153-58 (1998) (offering an account of 
moral motivation that is grounded, in part, on the idea of “justifiability to others”). For a 
discussion of deterrence in tort theory, see John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort 
Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 579-80 (2003). 
 86.  See Elizabeth Anderson, Reply to Criticisms of What is the Point of 
Equality?, BROWN ELECTRONIC ARTICLE REV. SERVICE (Jamie Dreier & David Estlund eds.) 
(Dec. 22, 1999), http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9912ande.html. 
 87.  Id.
 88.  Anderson uses the famous Brown v. Board of Education case as an example. For a 
discussion of how Brown v. Board of Education relates to relational equality, see Anderson, 
supra note 86 (discussing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (noting that sep-
arate but equal is “inherently” unequal)).  
 89.  See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (rev. ed. 2004) (telling the story of 
the lawsuit that led to Brown v. Board of Education as part of the civil rights movement’s 
struggle for greater social equality to rectify the gap between the country’s ideal of equality 
and the inequality that faced African Americans). 
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 It is a different kind of “acting against,” though, than chasing the 
car yourself and rear-ending her in return. That would be inflicting 
pain on another because of the pain you suffered from that person—
properly considered revenge or retaliation—and normatively frowned 
upon. Calling the police is not.90 By providing civil recourse, we help 
combat inequality through a mechanism where the person treated as 
less than an equal can say: “You are not better than me.”91
 This way of instantiating equality—by acting against inequality—
is familiar in our structure of government. It is constitutional, having 
been identified by legal scholars as part of an “anti-caste” principle 
through both the Fourteenth Amendment and other parts of the Con-
stitution.92 In this sense, it operates to express and operationalize the 
ideal that no one will be treated as second-class citizens because of 
some reason unrelated to the merit of whatever is at issue. This is 
most visible in the Equal Protection Clause and associated claims, 
but we can also see this principle in Title VII discrimination claims, 
giving employees and prospective employees a tool to demand that 
employers not treat them as second-class citizens because of immu-
table characteristics like race or gender, or core beliefs like religion.93
It is even reflected in statutes such as the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934,94 which was passed after millions of small investors were left in 
ruins after people lied to them about the value of investments.  
 And it is reflected in the common law, adopted in all states initial-
ly so that the colonists could have the “rights of English citizens,” in-
cluding the right to recourse against those who had wronged them. 
                                           
 90.  For more on the distinction between acting against someone for retaliation, versus 
to demand answers or hold someone accountable, see Solomon, supra note 4, at 1812-14.  
 91.  Two tort scholars that come close to this idea, I believe, are Allen Linden and 
Joseph Little. See Linden, supra note 81, at 55; Allen M. Linden, Reconsidering Tort 
Law as Ombudsman, in ISSUES IN TORT LAW 1, 21 (Freda M. Steel & Sanda Rogers-Magnet 
eds., 1983) (“Tort law, with its human focus, enables individuals to protest peacefully and 
rationally against the abuse of power.”); Joseph W. Little, Up With Torts, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 861 (1987). See also Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, 
and For the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 8, 167 
(2008) (“Tort law is our primary fall-back method of empowering ordinary people to remedy 
injustices to themselves through the court system.”). Though scholars such as Thomas 
Koenig, Michael Rustad, and Carl Bogus emphasize the ways in which tort law can make 
up for imbalances of power, their work emphasizes the instrumental benefits to society, 
while mine emphasizes the effect on individuals and their relations to one another. See 
generally THOMAS KOENIG & MICHAEL RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2003); CARL T.
BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA (2001); see also Perry, supra note 77, at 
959 (analyzing “the empowering and disempowering effects of the law”). 
 92.  See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411 (1994); 
see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 338-39 (1993).
 93.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). See also
Ed Rubin, The Obama Administration and the Rise of Positive Constitutional Rights to 
Sustenance, Health, Housing and Education, Conference on the Constitution in the Age of 
Obama, presentation at the William and Mary Law Review Symposium: Constitutional 
Transformations: the State, the Citizen, and the Changing Role of Government (Feb. 25, 2011). 
 94.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).  
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has called “the right to sue and defend in 
the courts” one of the “most essential privileges of citizenship.”95 It is 
in the same family as other kinds of rights and other aspects of gov-
ernment, but it plays a distinctive role.  
 To be sure, whether or not the exercise of the right to recourse ac-
tually promotes social equality will depend greatly on the social con-
text.96 If suing someone is frowned upon, thought to be poor form, 
then the right to recourse might not increase social equality or pro-
vide a certain minimum level of status or respect that aims towards 
social equality.97 Indeed, this may well be the case in many parts of 
the United States today.98 But if the social context is such that exer-
cising the right might instantiate social equality, then it must be dis-
tributed according to just principles, in a way that does not contrib-
ute to existing social inequalities.    
 In the next Part, I briefly explore the distinctive aspects of civil 
recourse theory by comparing the current civil justice system to three 
alternative models: (1) criminal law; (2) an accident compensation 
system like New Zealand where individuals apply to the government 
for compensation; and (3) a civil justice system where apologies, not 
money damages, are the primary mode of repair.99
                                           
 95.  Chambers v. Baltimore, 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1903) (dictum) (“The right to sue and 
defend in the courts . . . is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the 
foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most essential privileges of 
citizenship . . . . Equality of treatment in this respect is not left to depend upon comity 
between the states, but is granted and protected by the Federal Constitution.”); see also
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 85 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that “due 
process entails the right ‘to sue and defend in the courts,’ a right we have described as ‘the 
alternative of force’ in an organized society” (citing Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148)); Goldberg, 
supra note 42, at 586-87 (arguing that the Due Process Clause protects the “right to 
redress”). Despite the rhetoric in Chambers, the Court has not always protected this right 
with such vigor.  
 96.  For a comparison of litigation in the United States with other countries, see
Galanter, supra note 75, at 55-61 (noting that, at least in Japan, alternatives to litigation 
developed because elites believed “that litigation was destructive to a hierarchical social 
order” (quoting John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD.
359, 373 (1978))); see also TOM GINSBURG & ROBERT A. KAGAN, Introduction: Institutional-
ist Approaches to Courts as Political Actors, in INSTITUTIONS & PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE 
APPROACHES 5-6 (Tom Ginsburg & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2005); David M. Engel,
Landscapes of the Law: Injury, Remedy, and Social Change in Thailand, 43 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 61, 89 (2009) (discussing how delocalization in northern Thailand has reduced the 
likelihood for compensation of injuries through civil suits because of social conceptions of 
injury and the law); David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 551, 551-
54 (1984) (showing how the values of self-reliance and individualism in a rural American 
community caused citizens to frown upon people who brought law suits) [hereinafter, 
Engel, Bird’s Song].
 97.  See Engel, Bird’s Song, supra note 96. Thanks to Pete Alces and Lan Cao for this point. 
 98.  Id.
 99.  In a slightly different context, I have explored two (no-fault and apologies) of these 
three alternatives before. See Solomon, supra note 35, at 331-36. 
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IV.   THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF CIVIL RECOURSE
While sharing with corrective justice the view of tort as a law of 
private wrongs built around a normative connection between the do-
er” and the “sufferer,”100 civil recourse theory emphasizes a few as-
pects of tort law that (arguably) distinguish it from corrective justice 
theory.101 These include the fact that the plaintiff decides whether to 
bring a claim, and the plaintiff prosecutes the claim.102 Even if the 
civil recourse theorists are misguided in suggesting that these as-
pects distinguish recourse from corrective justice, they are distinct 
points of emphasis.  
That is to say, we might profitably view the debate between civil 
recourse and corrective justice—as with many legal-theoretical de-
bates—as about which aspects of tort law are essential and which are 
merely contingent. In this light, a key distinction is that corrective 
justice theory places the payment of money damages as a central 
component of the practice of corrective justice, while civil recourse 
seems to view the remedy of money damages as merely socially and 
historically contingent, while still playing a sensible role in an insti-
tution animated by the right to recourse. 
If civil recourse theory is to have any bite—or put differently, to 
be sufficiently distinguished from corrective justice as to warrant dis-
cussion as a separate theory—then the aspects of tort law empha-
sized by civil recourse must carry the bulk of the normative weight of 
what makes tort law distinctive, or gives it its normative force.  
Put differently, and more sharply in the terms of this Article, the 
question is whether equal distribution of the right to recourse—as 
opposed to the right to compensation, the right to punish, or anything 
else—is a key component of a state’s commitment to social equality, 
as I have argued.  
 To test our intuitions on this score, we can look at other institu-
tions like tort law where certain features are not present. Consider 
three such institutions: (1) criminal law, where the state decides 
whether to bring and prosecutes the claim of wrongdoing; (2) no-fault 
compensation schemes such as New Zealand accident law or the 9/11 
Compensation Fund, where victims apply to the government for com-
pensation and need not prove fault; and (3) a hypothetical tort-law 
regime where the most common remedy was an apology, and not 
money damages. 
                                           
 100.  These terms are Aristotle’s. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 125 
(Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1985) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
 101.  I do not mean to suggest that civil recourse is exclusively a theory about the struc-
ture and remedy of tort law. The writings of the principal recourse theorists also have a lot 
to say about primary rights and wrongs, but while valuable, these are largely consistent 
with corrective justice theory. I focus here on the arguable differences.  
 102.  See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra 45.  
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A.   Criminal Law 
 Like tort law, criminal law can be conceived as a mechanism for 
responding to wrongs. Criminal law differs from the dimensions em-
phasized under civil recourse theory by the fact that the state, not 
the victim, both decides whether legal action occurs and brings the 
action. Though some have argued that the state affirms an individu-
al’s self-worth by standing up for her in response to a wrong, the in-
dividual herself being empowered to respond is stronger.103 Moreover, 
in criminal law, the state decides what is an adequate response to the 
wrong from the wrongdoer in deciding what kind of plea agreement 
to accept. In civil justice, the victim decides what constitutes ade-
quate amends.  
 Criminal law, then, fails to acknowledge the individual’s agency. 
Because the individual does not decide whether to bring the action, 
she is still in that place of vulnerability or dependency. To be sure, 
recent efforts to give victims a more active role in criminal justice 
proceedings may change this assessment a bit.104 But for now, one 
could argue that by being dependent on the state for recourse, the 
state affirms her position of dependency. 
B.   No-Fault Systems 
 The answer for many scholars to the problems of the tort system is 
to move to a no-fault system of social insurance for accidents, like in 
New Zealand. In that system, when people get harmed, the govern-
ment provides resources for people who are injured, funded by a gen-
eral tax, and without regard to fault.105 In such no-fault regimes, the 
claimants decide whether to bring claims and do so themselves. In 
this way, no-fault systems are consistent with civil recourse in a way 
that criminal law is not. 
 But such a system does not promote equal accountability or ad-
vance the relational idea of equality—the idea that we owe one an-
other obligations or answers—in the way that the right to recourse 
                                           
 103.  As Nate Oman put it, the helplessness of victims “cannot be remedied by becoming 
the passive recipient of self-respect that is dispensed by the welfare right by the State.” See
Oman, supra note 4, at 47. 
 104.  See, e.g., Jayne Barnard, Listening to Victims, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1479 (2011). 
 105.  For an overview of New Zealand’s no-fault accident compensation scheme, see 
Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 976, 982-84 (1985) (describing that, in New Zealand, the Accident Compensation Act 
makes it mandatory for victims of automobile accidents, whether at fault or not, to seek 
redress from a government fund, as opposed to bringing a tort action for damages). See also
Peter Davis et al., Compensation for Medical Injury in New Zealand: Does “No-Fault” 
Increase the Level of Claims Making and Reduce Social and Clinical Selectivity?, 27 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 833, 835-37 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187 (2008); Rosemary Tobin & Elsabe Schoeman, The New Zealand 
Accident Compensation Scheme: The Statutory Bar and the Conflict of Laws, 53 AM. J.
COMP. L. 493 (2005). 
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does by literally allowing an individual to confront another and forc-
ing the other to answer. 
 Indeed, this was a criticism that some made of the 9/11 Victim 
Compensation Fund, a no-fault compensation mechanism set up in 
the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. As Gillian Hadfield 
put it, civil litigation would be  
the only way that a housewife from New Jersey, for example, can 
make the President of American Airlines or the owner of the World 
Trade Center show up and answer questions about her husband’s 
death, demanding information about what security screening pro-
cedures were followed or not and why, what fire safety measures 
were taken or not and why.106
 Because the claimants in no-fault systems are generally not em-
powered to demand answers about why and how they were wronged, 
no-fault does not retain the normative force of the civil justice sys-
tem, as explicated through recourse theory. 
C.   Apologies as a Remedy 
 We can also think of a hypothetical civil justice system where 
apologies are the most common remedy, as opposed to money damag-
es. Indeed, many hospitals and doctors have adopted policies in the 
last several years to apologize to patients and their families in cases 
of arguable medical error. Research has shown that these apology 
practices have significantly decreased the number of medical mal-
practice claims brought.107 If one views civil justice as a way of forcing 
actors to internalize the costs of their risky activities, as some econ-
omists do, or as a second-best mechanism of “giving back” individuals 
their means, as some corrective justice theorists do,108 then apologies 
are not consistent with a civil justice system. 
                                           
 106.  Gillian K. Hadfield, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: “An Unprec-
edented Experiment in American Democracy” 23 (S. Cal. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 05-7, 
2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=690401. Hadfield 
describes this as the “normative procedural aspect of litigation: the capacity of a citizen to 
bring to bear the power of the state to demand an accounting for allegations of wrongdoing 
in open court.” Id. at 15. 
 107.  See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t Know About the Role of 
Apologies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1015-24 
(2005) (reviewing the survey, experimental, and case study evidence, but cautioning that 
considerably more empirical research remains to be done); Lee Taft, Apology and Medical 
Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 55, 85-87 (2005) (reviewing the 
evidence, consisting largely of case studies); see also Aaron Lazare, The Healing Forces of 
Apology in Medical Practice and Beyond, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 251, 256-64 (2008) (discussing 
the potential positive consequences of medical professionals apologizing to victims of 
malpractice, while noting some risks of such apologies). 
 108.  See Ripstein, supra note 25, at 1982-84 (explaining the relationship between the 
wrong and the damages remedy in tort in these terms). 
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 But a civil recourse view, at least of the kind I have described 
here, might see a genuine apology as precisely the kind of interper-
sonal expression of equality and accountability that ought to be pro-
moted.109 The apology has the unusual and quite powerful qualities of 
personally acknowledging and affirming the right of the person 
harmed to demand an explanation and the obligation of the wrongdo-
er to provide one.  
 Taking responsibility through an apology is a way the wrongdoer 
says: “Yes, I recognize that I owe and owed obligations to you, and I 
violated those obligations.” In looking the person in the eye, the 
wrongdoer acknowledges the other person as a social equal, whose 
interests are worthy of respect. 
 Some have argued that apologies in the shadow of potential law-
suits—or as a court-ordered remedy—are not genuine and therefore 
have no moral force. Even if the presence of mixed motives diminish-
es the moral strength of the apology, though, it may have value in a 
civil recourse framework. To the extent that victims and their fami-
lies want an explanation of what happened or an acceptance of re-
sponsibility, an apology may meet those desires. Moreover, the fact 
that the victim receives an answer or explanation means that an 
apology may better meet the demands of civil recourse than the pay-
ment of money damages, and certainly than no-fault systems. 
 These examples—criminal law, no-fault systems, and apologies as 
a remedy—help highlight the key distinctive features of the right to 
recourse. First, there is the direct relational aspect of the way that it 
expresses, before any harm is occurred, that you have rights against 
others, and they have obligations to you. Then, that expression is 
made concrete after harm has occurred by allowing victims the au-
tonomy to bring a lawsuit themselves, to decide whether to bring it at 
all, and to determine on what terms to make amends and to what 
degree to accept some measure of accountability.110 The expression is 
further strengthened by the fact that the response to this demand—
whether in the form of an explanation, an acknowledgment of wrong-
doing, or even a silent offer of compensation—must be directed to the 
victim, the one who has been wronged and who had the moral au-
thority to make the demand in the first place. 
V. OBJECTIONS
 In this Part, I consider two broad sets of objections to this justifi-
cation of civil recourse. Recall the basic claim: Tort law is justified in 
part as a fair distribution of the right to hold accountable those who 
                                           
 109.  But see Goldberg, supra note 42, at 602-03 (suggesting that an apology would not 
provide “satisfaction” to those who suffered significant harm).  
 110.  See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 45, at 733-35.  
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have wronged you by interfering with your rights of personhood and 
property. And a fair distribution of this right contributes to social or 
relational equality. 
 The first set of objections can be summarized as whether this ac-
count can really be a plausible justification for tort law, as opposed to 
certain kinds of procedure, litigation finance, or private law general-
ly. The second set of objections asks whether our current tort system 
is really an important component (or even a positive one) for distribu-
tive justice and social equality. 
A.   Plausible Justification for Tort Law? 
One set of objections might see the account offered here as too 
limited and narrow in a few different ways, leading to the conclusion 
that this cannot be a plausible political justification for tort law.  
 From one direction, one could ask whether the right to recourse is 
fairly described as being limited to torts. After all, one could argue 
that the right to recourse seems to refer to all private law, and so 
must include contract and property.111 One could take this a step fur-
ther and argue that it refers to any legal right or obligation for which 
there is a private right of action, thereby going beyond the traditional 
common law categories and drawing in any number of privately en-
forceable rights. Then the question becomes whether the right to re-
course is usefully thought of as something uniquely justified in the 
case of tort-like wrongs. 
 From a slightly different direction, one could argue that the politi-
cal justification offered here may support certain procedural rules, or 
a way of financing litigation (such as the contingency fee), that pro-
motes access to the courts. For example, whether one can hold anoth-
er accountable for wrongs depends heavily on the ability to bring a 
case and not have it dismissed before discovery, which may be getting 
more difficult.112 And it might depend on the kind and level of dam-
ages available, which will affect the lawyer’s willingness to invest 
resources in the case. 
                                           
 111.  See Keating, supra note 24, at 43 (“[Providing redress to those whose rights have 
been violated] is . . . distinctive of private law in general, not of tort law in particular. Con-
tracts, property, and restitution share the same structure.”). But see Zipursky, supra note 
42, at 645-48 (articulating how the right to recourse does fit coherently within all of private 
law, while still playing a unique role in tort law specifically).  
 112.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 U.S. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 U.S. 
1955 (2007). For a discussion of the implications of Twombly, see Scott Dodson, Pleading 
Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 140 (July 9, 
2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (“In short, the best 
reading of Bell Atlantic is that Rule 8 now requires notice-plus pleading for all cases.”) and 
Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 143, 150-51 (2010). Thanks to Scott Dodson for pressing me on this point.  
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 But litigation finance and procedure are peripheral to what we think 
of as “tort law,” which includes certain concepts and doctrine, a set of 
limits internal to that area of law, and perhaps institutional practices 
like the normative power of the civil jury. So the argument goes. 
 Together, these arguments add up to an objection that the justifi-
cation of distributive justice in service of social equality encompasses 
at once too much (all private law) and too little (no real tort doctrine). 
These objections have some force, and I leave to another day the 
question of how well civil recourse fits with the rest of private law.  
 For now, we can say that it is particularly appropriate that some-
one who is harmed through a lack of due care by another—a sign that 
the vulnerable person is not worth worrying about—is empowered to 
stand up as a social equal and make a putatively legitimate demand 
of the person who wronged her. And we can acknowledge that in 
evaluating the value of tort law, we have to look at the institution 
through which it is implemented, not simply the particular rules un-
der the heading “Torts.”113 Indeed, the structure of the institution 
may well be the most important aspect of tort law from a political-
theory perspective—that the social-equality ideal is affirmed by al-
lowing an individual to respond to a wrong done to her.  
B.   Is This the System We Would Really Have If Concerned about 
Distributive Justice and Social Equality?  
 One might also raise the following objection: if we define distribu-
tive justice broadly, then it can encompass access to justice, status, 
and the like. And perhaps our existing civil justice system advances 
these values. But even so, the argument goes, if we look at the effect 
of tort law on distributive justice overall—that is, if we truly take in-
to account all the social goods implicating distributive justice—then 
the tort law is a very poor tool for advancing it, and perhaps it cre-
ates a net harm to distributive justice. 
 My response is that I view distributive justice in a scheme, bor-
rowing from Michael Walzer, of “complex equality.”114 In such a 
scheme, one looks at distributive justice within a variety of spheres, 
but the distributive justice is contained within each sphere. That is to 
say, if tort law advances equal distribution of status, respect, and re-
latedly, access to justice, it is of no moment—or at least does not take 
away from those achievements—to say that tort law does not advance 
distributive justice in material goods. 
                                           
 113.  See Hershovitz, supra note 38, at 136. 
 114.  See WALZER, supra note 52, at 19 (“In formal terms, complex equality means that 
no citizen’s standing in one sphere or with regard to one social good can be undercut by his 
standing in some other sphere, with regard to some other good.”). For another discussion of 
complex equality, see generally PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY, supra note 20. 
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 The right to recourse, for example, might fit into Walzer’s “securi-
ty and welfare,” in the way it acts to protect the underlying right,115
David Miller’s “equality of status,” in the way that it gives each indi-
vidual the standing or moral authority to hold another to account,116
or John Rawls’ most important “primary good” of “self-respect.”117
Empowering individuals themselves to confront those who have 
wronged them might foster self-respect in a way that the criminal 
law does not, for example.  
 Another form of this objection begins: If you really cared about dis-
tributive justice and social equality, then . . . . One version of this ob-
jection follows: then you ought to support a strict liability, or no-fault 
system. Gregory Keating’s work supports a version of this argument. 
For Keating, large-scale, risk-creating enterprises particularly ought 
to bear the cost without regard to fault because of their superior abil-
ity to spread the cost among their customers.118 This is a much more 
just way to distribute the burden or cost of risks, according to schol-
ars like Keating. 
 Another version of this “if you really cared” critique focuses on 
other institutions that work towards this kind of interpersonal social 
equality as well as, or better than, the civil justice system. For exam-
ple, public schools, in providing equal opportunity for all citizens, al-
low individuals to get education that will allow them to relate as 
equals, regardless of background. Our progressive income tax looks 
at existing levels of income and does not allow the inequality that 
results to dominate social relations. Rather, a progressive tax redis-
tributes income to put people on a more equal footing. 
 But unlike the other institutions that I mentioned—public schools, 
a progressive tax system, social security, and universal health insur-
ance—tort law, like criminal law, is one of the few public institutions 
                                           
 115.  See WALZER, supra note 52, at 65-66. 
 116.  Miller argues that this type of equality “is not a good that can be directly 
distributed equally.” Miller, supra note 20, at 199. For Miller, status is “a person’s basic 
standing within a society.” Id. at 206. 
 117.  Although much of the discussion surrounding John Rawls’ Theory of Justice con-
cerns the proper distribution of primary goods such as income and wealth, Rawls also in-
cludes rights and liberties in his social primary goods category. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEO-
RY OF JUSTICE 54 (rev. ed. 1999) (stating “the chief primary goods at the disposition of soci-
ety are rights, liberties, [etc.]”). In discussing primary goods, John Rawls acknowledges 
that “perhaps the most important primary good” is that of self-respect. RAWLS, supra note 
10, at 396. Although self-respect and the respect of others, the kind of respect that is cen-
tral to the type of equality that I am arguing civil recourse theory advances, are not the 
same, surely there is a significant relationship. Rawls, too, acknowledges this: “And for the 
most part this assurance is sufficient whenever in public life citizens respect one another’s 
ends and adjudicate their political claims in ways that also support their self-esteem.” Id.
at 442.  
 118.  See Keating, supra note 19, at 219.
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that really treats and engages people as moral agents.119 The institu-
tion of tort law treats those who sue as moral agents who have the 
authority to make demands of others and to hold them accountable. 
On the flip side, those who are sued are also treated as moral agents 
who must answer to others and who must take responsibility in this 
liberal society where individual responsibility is something we care 
about.120 Arguably, this kind of treatment makes a stronger state-
ment about social equality than any tax code ever could.  
VI.   CONCLUSION: THE STATE OF NATURE
 To sum up, the political theory of recourse I present here is an ex-
ample of a particular way that distributive justice and social equality 
might relate to one another. The good that is the subject of distribu-
tive justice—the right to hold accountable those who have wronged 
you—is something that the state provides, in part to help constitute a 
community where individuals relate to one another as equals. The 
right to recourse is not the only good that helps do this, of course; it 
may be that the right to vote, a minimum adequate income, and oth-
er goods are more important. But the right to recourse, distributed 
justly, plays a role.  
 One advantage of viewing civil recourse as a matter of distributive 
justice, broadly defined, is that it brings other issues into the existing 
policy debates around the civil justice system. So, for example, I have 
argued in prior work that thinking about a theory of civil recourse 
can shed light on contemporary debates on issues like tort reform,121
punitive and noneconomic damages,122 and preemption.123 But think-
                                           
 119.  See Hershovitz, supra note 38, at 110 (arguing that tort law treats people as moral 
agents in a way that regulation does not); see also R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 50 
(2007) (arguing that criminal law treats citizens as “hav[ing] both rights and 
responsibilities: we are answerable to each other for our conduct as citizens”); R.A. Duff, 
Rule-Violations and Wrongdoings, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY (Stephen Shute & A.P. 
Simester eds., 2002) (arguing that one of the purposes of criminal law is that the 
community will call their [moral] agents to account through a public criminal process). 
 120.  Solomon, supra note 4, at 1806 (“By forcing individuals to respond to a claim of 
wrong by another, we maintain their autonomy and treat them as part of a continued web 
of mutual obligation in our moral and political community, deserving of respect.”). 
 121.  Solomon, supra note 4, at 1754. I first got the idea from John C.P. Goldberg, What 
Are We Reforming? Tort Theory’s Place in Debates over Malpractice Reform, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1075 (2006); see also Goldberg, supra note 85, at 580-81 (arguing for the need of a 
theory of tort law that can make sense of various practices and principles in such a way 
that judges can have a cohesive account of what it is that they are actually doing). 
 122.  See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 105 (2005); see also Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages 
as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009). For another recent discussion of 
civil recourse and punitive damages, see Avihay Dorfman, What Is the Point of the Tort 
Remedy?, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 105, 140-62 (2010). 
 123.  See Solomon, supra note 4, at 1766-71. 
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ing about the right to recourse as a proper subject of distributive jus-
tice brings the question of “access to justice” into the foreground.  
 The degree of access to justice may not be equal—businesses and 
wealthy individuals can always hire lawyers to go around suing any-
one in sight. But there must be some basic access for individuals to 
respond to wrongs in order for the right to recourse to be distributive-
ly just and to genuinely serve a social-equality ideal.124 Whether or 
not our current system provides such access, and if not, how best to 
get there, are topics not part of the current debate.125 But if this polit-
ical theory of recourse is plausible, then they should be. 
 And so it might well be that in constructing a community of 
equals, the right to recourse is a necessary, or at least an important, 
ingredient. It might well be that in distributing the right to hold ac-
countable those who have wronged you by unduly interfering with 
aspects of your personhood, the state helps establish social equality, 
a set of relationships where, regardless of occupation or background, 
people address one another as mister and know they need to put on 
their blinker before changing lanes. 
                                           
 124.  See HOLMES, supra note 26, at 242 (arguing that classical liberal theorists thought 
that “[a]ccess to the courts must not be distributed according to merit, contribution, 
inherited social status, or even prior consent”). 
 125.  See Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 869 (2009). This is not to say that no one is talking about such matters. President 
Obama, for example, appointed Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe to be the head of 
an access to justice initiative in the Justice Department. See Charlie Savage, For an 
Obama Mentor, a Nebulous Legal Niche, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at A21. 
